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State v. Hubbard
2021-Ohio-3710
I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the social contract theory of philosophy, all people were
originally as free as the laws of nature will allow, and society only forms by
people trading that inherent freedom in favor of forming a society with
rules.1 As time has gone on, societies have continued to develop in which
these base rules have transmuted into written law that permeates through all
parts of life. As the law continues to progress and more and more of
everyday life is bounded by the words written on pages, it becomes
supremely necessary for people to know what conduct is allowable and
what is disallowed in an interconnected society. This foundational principle
is encapsulated by the pervasive belief that a person is only bound by the
laws that are in effect when they act.2
One of the main ways that governments protect their citizenry from
being subjected to unknowable law is by prohibiting law to apply
retroactively.3 Both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
Constitution protect citizens from being subjected to retroactive laws.4
While protecting against retroactivity, the purpose is not to ensure that a
person’s every prior act is immunized from future law but rather it is to
ensure that a person’s substantive rights are not affected by a new law being
applied to past conduct.5
Hubbard is a case in which a new registration scheme for violent
offenders is established in Ohio and that new registration scheme is being
applied to an offender whose offense and pleading took place before the
new registration scheme became effective.6 The regulatory scheme is
enacted under a grouping of laws that is collectively referred to as Sierah’s
Law.7 This scheme requires a certain group of offenders, described as
“violent offenders”, to register in a law enforcement database upon either
pleading guilty or being found guilty of a certain group of violent offenses.8

1. Social contract, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-contract (last accessed
Jan. 28, 2022).
2. State v. Hubbard, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3710, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3 (2021).
3. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3.
4. OH CONST. art. II, §28; U.S. CONST art. I, §9, cl. 2.
5. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3.
6. Id. at *2.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *4.
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The framework for this case is that Ohio has been struggling to
determine whether registration laws are such a burden on an individual as to
affect their substantive rights or if they are merely a regulatory process that
is a minor hassle the likes of renewing a driver’s license.9 The early cases in
this sphere dealt with sex offender registration laws in Ohio like Megan’s
Law or the Adam Walsh Act, where the supreme court had to wrestle with
the applicability of the registration law to people already convicted of sex
crimes.10 One of the major reasons that Hubbard made its way to being
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Ohio is that there was no definitive
answer or test provided when dealing with the sex offender registration
cases.11
The issue to be determined in this case is whether the Retroactivity
Clause of the Ohio Constitution is violated by applying the requirements of
Sierah’s Law to conduct that occurred prior to the law becoming effective.12
In determining this issue the Court attempts to determine whether the
registration law as applied to Appellant would be changing his substantive
rights and thus would run afoul of the retroactivity clause or if this is simply
a case in which he now has to abide by some small new regulatory
procedure.13 The way that the Court is able to determine if the law affects a
substantive right in a criminal situation is by determining if the statute is
punitive or remedial.14 In this case the Court determines that the statute is
not punitive in nature, and thus, it is not affecting Appellant’s substantive
rights by applying the requirements of Sierah’s Law to him.15 Thus, the
Court finds that applying Sierah’s Law to conduct prior to its effective date
does not run afoul of the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.16
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Sierah’s Law was enacted in 2018 and the law was to be put into effect
on March 20, 2019.17 “Appellant, Miquan D. Hubbard” entered a plea of
guilty to murder with a firearm specification for the killing of Jarius Gilbert
Jr. in 2018.18 Hubbard entered his guilty plea on March 7, 2019, before
9. Id.
10. See generally Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587; State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404 (1998); State v.
Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7 (2008); State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 (2011).
11. See generally Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587; State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404 (1998); State v.
Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7 (2008); State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 (2011).
12. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *2.
13. Id. at *3.
14. Id. at **7-8.
15. Id. at **7-9.
16. Id. at *10.
17. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *2.
18. Id. at *2.
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Sierah’s Law went into effect.19 Hubbard was sentenced on April 30, 2019,
after Sierah’s Law went into effect.20 The court notified Hubbard at
sentencing of the requirement for him to register as a “violent offender”.21
Hubbard objected to this application of Sierah’s Law by stating that it went
against the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.22 The court
overruled the objection and continued to provide the notification to
Hubbard.23
Hubbard appealed the decision to the Twelfth District Court of
Appeals.24 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in applying
Sierah’s Law stating that it did not run afoul of the Retroactivity Clause.25
The Twelfth District Court determined that Sierah’s Law did not affect a
substantive right and thus it would not be invalidated under the
Retroactivity Clause based upon how the Retroactivity Clause has been
applied to Ohio law.26 The Twelfth District Court then certified a conflict of
judgement with the Fifth District Court of Appeals.27 There was a certified
conflict because faced with the same issue the Fifth District Court held that
the application of Sierah’s Law to conduct that occurred prior to the
effective date of the statute would be violative of the Retroactivity Clause of
the Ohio Constitution and thus it would not be allowed.28 With a proper
certified conflict, the Supreme Court of Ohio took up the appeal in order to
quell the discord between the lower courts.29
COURT’S DECISION

III.

A. Majority Opinion by Justice Kennedy
The Court begins its discussion of the law in this case with the general
proposition that people are distrustful of law that is applied retroactively.30
The general belief of people is that they should be able to rely on the law
how it is not how it will be in some future.31 The Court finds that the way
that this belief was implemented into law in Ohio was through the language

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3.
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of the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.32 The Retroactivity
Clause states plainly that “The general assembly shall have no power to
pass retroactive laws. . .”33 The Court goes on to show that this plain
statement has been more nuanced in application and that not every law that
has retroactive implications is immediately barred.34
The Court has put into effect a two-part test to determine if the law that
is being retroactively applied is and unconstitutionally retroactive law.35 The
two-part test is “(1) whether the General Assembly expressly made the
statute retroactive and, if so, (2) whether the statute is substantive or
remedial.”36 The Court has no problem finding the first part of the test
satisfied due to the fact that both parties ceded the issue on appeal.37
The second part of the two-part test is where the difficulty arises and the
Court looks to the Williams case in order to find definitions to guide what is
“substantive” and what is “remedial.”38 “Substantive” statutes are those
which “impairs or takes away vested rights, affects an accrued substantive
right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as
to a past transaction, or creates a new right.”39 A “remedial” statute is one
that affect “only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely
substitute a new or more appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an
existing right.”40 The Court used these definitions to guide their inquiry on
whether or not Sierah’s Law is in effect a substantive or remedial law.41
The Court ensures to point out that this inquiry is distinct to Ohio law
and is not part in parcel with federal Ex Post Facto jurisprudence.42 The
court determines that the caselaw bears out different treatment for the
Retroactivity Clause than the Ex Post Facto provision in the United States
Constitution. 43
To begin to apply the definitions of substantive and remedial statutes,
the Court discusses the major points of Sierah’s Law. The Court boils down
the important points of the law to be that if a person is convicted of a certain
crime, they must register in a law enforcement database for violent
offenders.44 That database contains the information about the crime,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3.
OH CONST. art. II, § 28.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3 (quoting Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 at ¶8).
Id. at *3 (quoting Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 at ¶8).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *4.
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identifying information about the perpetrator, and the residence information
of the offender.45 The Court discusses that while the information is not
generally public it is accessible by a public records request.46 The law
requires that the offender register for ten years, they re-enroll annually, and
that they report any change in residency within three days of moving to the
sheriff of the county they moved to.47
The Court also discusses the potential penalty of a fifth-degree felony
charge if the offender is reckless in their non-compliance with the statutory
mandates.48 The statutes also provide a mechanism by which the person
may be alleviated of the requirement to register, which applies if the
offender was not the principal offender of the charged offense.49 To cap its
discussion of the statutes requirements, the Court states that the enrollment
period can be extended if the person is convicted “of another felony or any
misdemeanor offense of violence during the enrollment period or has
violated a term or condition of a sanction imposed under the offender’s
sentence.”50
Upon laying out the requirements of Sierah’s Law upon offenders the
Court then turns to a discussion of the Court’s treatment of the Retroactivity
Clause in conjunction with sex offender registration laws.51 The Court
points out that it has previously held that felons do not have a rightful
expectation that their felonious conduct will never be subject to future
regulation.52 Applying that idea the Court then looks to the Cook case in
which they held that retroactively applying Megan’s Law sex offender
registration to people already convicted of sex offenses did not run afoul of
the Retroactivity Clause.53 The Cook case found that the registration law as
applied to these individuals did nothing more than add small regulatory
requirements and did not rise to the level of “infringing on a substantive
right.”54
The legislature came back and updated Megan’s law after Cook was
decided which prompted the Ferguson case to be brought under the same
challenge with the Retroactivity Clause as the vehicle.55 The changed law
required the sex offender to register in multiple places, made the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *5.
Id. at *5 (citing R.C. 2903.43(D)(2)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5 (citing State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 281 (1988)).
Id. at *5 (citing Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 414).
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *5 (citing Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 412).
Id. at *5 (citing Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7 at ¶¶ 4,9).
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designation of sexual-predator permanent, and created a “publicly available
internet database” of registrants.56 Even with these more strenuous
requirements on the sex offenders, the court still found that the changes in
the law did not affect the substantive rights of the registrants and thus the
law could be retroactively applied.57
The Court finally reached its breaking point with sex offender
registration when the Adam Walsh Act replaced Megan’s Law for sexual
offender registration.58 The Court decided in Williams that the new
automatic tier system, the much more frequent registration requirements, the
reduced leniency in registering after a life change, and the new community
notification system created a registration scheme that was sufficiently
overbearing as to affect a registrant’s substantive rights.59 In finding that the
new scheme impacted a registrant’s substantive rights, the Court found that
any retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act would violate the
Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution and thus it was
impermissible.60
In determining whether Sierah’s Law is substantive or remedial the
court then analogizes Sierah’s Law to being more or less like either
Megan’s Law or the Adam Walsh Act.61 The court ends up finding that
Sierah’s Law looks a lot more like Megan’s Law than the Adam Walsh
Act.62 Salient differences that the court points out between Sierah’s Law and
the Adam Walsh Act is that the registration information is not publicly
available, the registration is yearly not every 180 or 90 days, the enrollment
is only for ten (10) years rather than a minimum of fifteen (15) for Adam
Walsh, and that for Sierah’s Law you only have to register in one place
rather than multiple.63
The Court then looks to see if on whole the implementation of Sierah’s
Law has the effect of increasing punishment, which is another way by
which it could be violative of the Retroactivity Clause.64 The Court finds
that there is no indication that Sierah’s Law was intended to increase
punishment for registrants.65 The Court divines that it was not the intention
of the legislature to increase punishment from the fact that registration laws
are generally tools for law enforcement not punishment, the database is not
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at *5 (citing Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7 at ¶¶ 4,9).
Id. at *5 (citing Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7 at ¶39).
Id. at *6.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *3 (citing Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 at ¶ 20).
Id. at *3 (citing Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344 at ¶ 21).
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at **6-7.
Id. at *7.
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public, the statutes were not codified in the section for penalties and
sentencing, and that these requirements are not imposed as a part of
sentencing.66
Recognizing that it is possible for the effect of the law to be punitive
even when the intent is not there the Court then performs an analysis to
determine if such a punitive effect is put forth by the law.67 The Court then
borrows from the United States Supreme Court case of Mendoza-Martinez
which provides a seven factor test to determine if the effect is punitive.68
The test is:
“Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the
inquiry, and may point in differing directions.”69
The Court finds that Sierah’s Law does not put in place any “affirmative
disability or restraint” because registering once a year is insufficient to find
this factor to be met.70 The Court also finds that the registration law is not
tied to the scienter of the crime as it is invoked automatically based on the
conviction alone, not based on any acknowledgement of wrongdoing.71 The
Court also dismisses the idea that a registration law promotes traditional
punishment by relying upon the Smith decision by the United States
Supreme Court where registration schemes, in that case a sex offender
registration scheme, was determined to not be promoting traditional
punishment.72
The Court finds that Sierah’s Law is not attempting to be retributive or
deterrent but rather just provide more protection to the community by
keeping track of potentially dangerous individuals.73 The Court ends off the
factor test by finding that the requirement of registering once annually in
66. Id. at **7-8.
67. Id. at *7.
68. Id. at *7 (quoting State v. Casalicchio, 58 Ohio St.3d 178, 182 (1991), quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
69. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
70. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *7 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
71. Id. at *8.
72. Id. at *7 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)).
73. Id. at *9.
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person is not excessive in the face of the remedial purpose of protecting the
health and safety of the general public.74
The Court ends its analysis with a refrain that keeping with Ohio
precedent is important and foundational for a just legal system to continue,
that the precedent supports the conclusion that the law is indeed not
impacting a substantive right of the Appellant, and that there is no violation
of the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.75
B. Dissent by Justice Stewart
The dissent begins by stating that the law in this area is impermissibly
unclear and finding that the opinion issued by the Court only works to fuel
that fire.76 The dissent would do two things in order to clarify the law in the
application of the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.77 First, the
dissent would find that the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution is
fully inclusive of the federal prohibition against Ex Post Facto laws,
outlawing retroactive application of law if the law either expressly or in
effect increases a punishment for prior criminal conduct.78 Secondly, the
dissent would instruct all lower courts to do a proper and full Ex Post Facto
analysis using the “intents-effects test” promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court.79 Under the “intents-effects test”, the Court would
determine whether the intention behind the statute was to be remedial and
civil or if it was to be criminal and if it was determined that it was intended
to be remedial, if that intention was properly put into effect or if it had a
punitive effect.80
The dissent determined that in contrast with the majority opinion the
precedent has been varied and unclear, in large part, due to the continued
insistence that the Retroactivity Clause is not interpreted the same as the
federal Ex Post Facto analysis.81 The dissent finds the problem further
muddied because the Court does apply the Ex Post Facto analysis when the
challenge is raised under the federal constitution but still refuses if the
challenge is only brought under the Ohio Retroactivity Clause.82
The dissent found the continued indigence of the Court in not applying
the Ex Post Facto analysis to be unfounded in the history behind the
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at *9.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at **9-10 (Stewart J., dissenting).
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-93).
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11.
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ratification of the Retroactivity Clause.83 The dissent highlights legislative
history that supports the idea that the drafter of the Retroactivity Clause
intended it cover Ex Post Facto laws completely and only wrote the
language differently because the drafters wanted to cover some civil law as
well as criminal.84 Thus, the dissent concludes that it is non-sensical to
continue to treat the tests and standards for the Ohio Constitution and the
United States Constitution as being alien to one another.
The dissent then dissects the caselaw that the majority uses to support
its opinion, analyzing both the treatment under the Ohio Retroactivity
Clause claims and any federal Ex Post Facto Claims.85 Under Cook the Ohio
Retroactivity Clause challenge was quickly found to be unfounded as the
changes to the registration scheme were said to be “de minimis procedural
requirements” and that the notification provisions were not punitive either
because they were just disseminating truthful information.86 Then the Cook
court moved on to the analysis under the federal Ex Post Facto challenge,
where it determined that the law was not intended to be punitive and the
effect was not punitive by performing the factor test laid out by MendozaMartinez.87 The dissent then performed a very similar analysis of the
decision that was made in the Ferguson case.88 The dissent yet again talked
about how the court did not find issue under the Ohio Retroactivity Clause
nor did it find the factors weighed differently in the federal Ex Post Facto
laws.89
The dissent then moves to discuss Williams where the dissent asserts
that the court did not say that it was doing the “intents-effects” test but that
was essentially what was done.90 The dissent essentially asserts that the
Williams decision should have signified a shift in Ohio law away from the
separate analyses for Retroactivity Clause versus Ex Post Facto law into a
situation where the two work harmoniously together.91
After providing the framework that the dissent believes the law should
operate under it then performs an analysis of Sierah’s Law under that
framework.92 The first step of this analytical framework is the determination
of whether the intent of the legislature was to promulgate a punitive statute

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at **11-12.
Id. at *12.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at **12-16.
Id. at *13 (quoting Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 412-14).
Id. at *14 (citing Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 416-17).
Id. at *14 (citing Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7).
Id. at *14 (citing Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7).
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *17.
Id. at *17.
Id. at **19-28.
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or if the intent is to create a civil, remedial statute.93 The dissent finds that at
best the legislative intent could be construed as mixed.94 The dissent finds
the factors weighing in favor of finding punitive intent was that there was
no language on the face of the statute saying non-punitive, previous
registration laws have been explicit in stating they were non-punitive, the
legislature still placed Sierah’s Law in the title for the criminal code, the
possibility of indefinite or lifetime registration, the ease to extend the
registration period as opposed to the ability to end the registration period,
ending the registration period is tied to paying all imposed financial
sanctions, and that the information is still readily available via public record
request.95 The dissent finds that there is some evidence pointing against
punitive intent which is as follows, the court must look to public safety
factors when analyzing whether to relieve a non-principal offender of their
registration requirements like analysis of “risk of recidivism and continued
threat to community.”96 This leads the dissent to implicate that the
legislature did have punitive intent in drafting, however the dissent
continues beyond the intent analysis stating that it is mixed.97
The next step of the dissent’s analysis is if the intent is inconclusive
then the effect of the statute must be analyzed to see if it is punitive.98 The
dissent finds that Sierah’s Law is unequivocally punitive in effect and finds
this using the same Mendoza-Martinez factor test that the majority applied.
The dissent finds that there is no question that Sierah’s Law concerns is
already criminalized as the registration doesn’t come into effect unless
someone is admitting to or proven to have committed a certain class of
crime.99 A similar discussion is given by the dissent as to the requirement of
scienter, because without an admission or finding of the scienter of one of
these heinous crimes, there would be no trigger of the statute.100 Thirdly, the
dissent says that it clearly furthers “traditional aims of punishment” by
having a person be presumptively a violent offender rather than a previously
convicted individual and the possibility of lifetime reporting with a
mechanism that is both easily met and also mandatory.101
The first factor that the dissent spends time explicitly refuting the
majority is whether Sierah’s Law constitutes an “affirmative disability or

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at *20.
Id. at *20.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at **20-21.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *21.
Id. at *22.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *22.
Id. at *22.
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restraint.”102 In contrast to the majority the dissent finds a system where the
registrant has to report in person annually, to the sheriff, report upon
moving within three days, and is subject to a felony charge if found to have
not complied to be a significant restraint on the registrants freedom of
movement.103
The next factor in major contention for the dissent is “Whether the type
of sanction imposed has been historically regarded as punishment.”104 As an
introduction the dissent dispels with the belief that the Smith precedent is
dispositive of the factor by showing that when Smith was decided
registration laws were still very new, the requirements of that registration
law were not the same, and the recidivism analysis was based on, at best,
suspect data.105 In showing that the Smith precedent is not dispositive of the
factor, the dissent then goes on to say that if confronted with modern data,
the requirements in Sierah’s Law, and the effects of public registration in
such a category on a person, it is hard to say if the holding in Smith would
have been the same.106
The last factor the dissent deals with is a combination of two of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors into the singular summation of “Whether the law
is excessive in relation to its remedial purpose.”107 The dissent states that
often this factor is considered to be the most influential of all the factors,
and while it is not dispositive, if the determination is that the law is
excessive, then it is quite likely that the law is punitive in effect.108 The
dissent finds that the law is indeed “excessive in relation to its remedial
purpose” for a multitude of reasons. One such reason is that there is not
discretion left to the judge to determine either if the person is not a threat
anymore to be removed from the requirements or that a person can’t argue
their low risk in the first place.109 Another such reason is that the extension
of the reporting period is also mandated, there is no discretion for the trial
judge to make an assessment of the true risk the individual poses.110 A
subsequent reason is that the offense that extends the reporting period need
not indicate further violent tendencies, it can yet again be automatic based
upon the categorization of the crime.111 On top of those factors pointing
toward excessiveness, the dissent finds there is also the underlying lack of
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at *23.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *22 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *7 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 92-3, 97-8, 102-03).
Id. at **24-27.
Id. at *27 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
Id. at *27.
Id. at *28.
Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at *28.
Id. at *28.
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proof that these individuals are a higher public safety risk to begin with.112
Finally, the dissent points out that if the purpose was truly to stop violent
recidivism, it is excessive to extend reporting for non-violent offenses, and
if to stop all recidivism then extension to indefinite or lifetime reporting for
something like a simple possession offense would be excessive as well.113
In summation, the dissent finds that the majority is flawed not only in
its application of the law but also in the analytical framework that the
majority uses to analyze the law.114 The dissent propounds that the Court
recognize that the test of the Retroactivity Clause as applied to a criminal
statute is the same as a federal Ex Post Facto analysis, with there being no
indication that the analysis should have been different in the first place.115
IV.

ANALYSIS

The predicate facts of this case seem to be narrow in scope and
applicability, but the fundamental debate is one of huge import. The
determination on whether the legislature is permitted to subject a person to a
change in their way of life, based on something that could have happened
years if not decades ago, has widespread import for all Ohioans.
Not only are the ramifications of the decision issued by the court
impactful for the people affected by this retroactive application of Sierah’s
Law but there is also widespread impact for all people by the perpetuation
of the current analytical framework for analyzing if a law should be
invalidated under the Retroactivity Clause.116 The dissent is persuasive
when it points out that under the Court’s opinion there is no solid precedent
or singular methodology by which to approach a Retroactivity Clause
case.117 Under the Court’s opinion there is an amalgamation of somewhat
conflicting caselaw that is woven together, seemingly for the sake of
continuing the precedent of the court, without any new guidance on what is
truly dispositive of these sorts of cases.
The main flaw with the Court’s opinion announced in this case would
seem to be less about the analysis that was done on whether Sierah’s Law is
actually affecting substantive rights and much more to do with the analytical
framework that the Court utilized. The dissent provides a compelling
argument using the legislative history of the ratification of the Retroactivity
Clause to show that the original drafters and the original adopters
envisioned the Clause to act at a minimum as the Ex Post Facto clause of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at *28.
Id. at *28.
See generally Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587 at **10-28.
Id.
Id.
Id. at **10-11 (Stewart J., dissenting).
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the United States Constitution does with the change in language to allow for
more protection against retroacting laws.118 The dissent sets a stage by
which it is hard to argue that the analysis for the Ohio Retroactivity Clause
should not be the same as the federal Ex Post Facto when the changes were
only to expand upon the minimum that the federal system set.
Not only does the dissent put forth a compelling argument based upon
the legislative history, but it also supplies a system that has cut and dry tests
for application of the rule. There is likely never a perfect test and with both
the dissent and the majority applying the Mendoza-Martinez test and
coming out completely differently, it is safe to say that the implementation
of this proposed framework would not solve all debates.119 However, the
proposed framework is still much better than what is ostentatiously applied
by the majority opinion. The framework is better not because the result is
assured but rather because both sides are on equal footing. Under the
dissent’s framework, there is a set of tests that would be applied in every
case that deals with retroactive application of a criminally related law. This
would mean that the guesswork about which precedent is more persuasive at
the time or comparing shades of case analogy would be thrown out in favor
of a system in which at least begins with the same underpinnings.
There is likely to never be a silver bullet, bright line solution to any
problem in the legal world, however that does not imply that every problem
need start in the most middling of gray areas. In the area of criminal law, a
person’s very freedom and ability to live is being put in contest. There
should be some measure of security or finality when it comes to a
determination relating to such an important area of law. In this case the
retroactive application of Sierah’s Law to past criminal conduct, throws that
finality back into flux without the Appellant ever having the ability to have
know whether the provision would apply to his case.120 In such an instance
the least protection that an individual should receive is a stable test that will
be applied for the determination to be made. In this case that stable test and
finality is much better protected by the dissent’s espoused solution than the
judgement that is provided by the majority.
V.

CONCLUSION

A person may very well sign a social contract when entering society,
but that does not mean they have given up the right to know the terms of the
deal. Every individual is governed by the laws of the area that they live in,
whether they choose to know those rules or remain ignorant. The issue does
118. Id. at **11-12.
119. Hubbard, 2021 WL 4898587.
120. Id. at *2.
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not arise in life or law when an individual has simply chosen to be ignorant
of the rules that bind them, but an issue becomes readily apparent when the
rule that is applied was not the rule when the action was taken. Hubbard is a
clear case of a person acknowledging that they did something horrendous
and not challenging the punishment as it was written when the offense was
committed, but rather is challenging the fact that the rule was changed in the
pendency between the commission of the crime and the sentencing.121 The
rule of law in Ohio was indisputably such that Hubbard would not have had
to perform any sort of violent offender registration upon a plea of guilty and
sentencing but two months prior.122
Therefore, this case is not one about whether Hubbard deserves what
Sierah’s Law requires of him, or whether the law is wise, valid, or
imbecilic. This case is one about whether the expectation of society is met
when a law can be changed after something has happened and have the
consequences of the change bear on that prior action. Not only is such an
application granted in this instance, but the test that was used to determine if
this would be the case is nigh on indecipherable to try and replicate. In a
situation where the Court is attempting to set precedent on when a law is
allowed to act in a behavior that most people, according to the Court itself,
find “distasteful” there is no rule set or guiding principle given, there is just
a web of half overturned precedent.
The dissent is able to provide at least a principle to approach every
question of this type with, and able to find a reasoned explanation for why
the principle is well founded in the history of the constitutional provision
itself. There may be a lot of room for debate in the application of the tests
that the dissent puts forward to be the universal standard, however that at
least puts litigants in the same arena to be able to properly advocate for their
clients. The Appellant may be a career criminal that would do the same
crime if given another opportunity, or may be a person that happened to be
in the wrong place at the wrong time, but either way they deserved to know
what was coming to them when that incident occurred in 2018. If not for the
Appellant then for the rest of Ohio, this is not a debate that can be shelved
upon such uncertainty and the framework advocated for by the dissent
should not be put to rest so easily.
MORGAN FISH
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